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Abstract 
The  exact  content  of  the  relation  between dignity and law has not been fully 
clarified yet. We only know that, although it has been used since antiquity, the notion 
entered international legislation and national constitutions only after WWII. Since then, the 
law uses the term, but it does not define it. Under the circumstances, can we talk about a 
legal  concept?  Is dignity a means or a purpose to law? Which is its relation with the 
fundamental human rights? Is it a right among others, or a basic ground for all of them? 
Here are a few questions to which the present article is trying to provide some answers… 
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It is remarkable how the good old notion of „dignity” entered the realm of 
law: hardly through the advent of the human rights, as we are inclined to believe, 
but two centuries later, through the gate opened by the barbarity of the two world 
conflagrations  that  splattered blood over the first half of the 20th Century on an 
unprecedented scale. 
Hence  the  acquaintance of dignity with the law was not the result of a 
deliberate project, the conclusion of the meeting of several enlightened minds that 
understood  the  need  for  the  concept  to  be  transferred  into  the regulatory area. 
Instead  it  was  prompted  by  dramatic  events  that  crippled the human being in a 
forthright shaking manner, on a wide scale. In other words, human dignity needed 
to be massively mutilated in order to remind us of its existence. 
However,  the  fact  in  itself  is  not  surprising.  In  truth,  no  fundamental 
institution of a state founded on the rule of law – or the rule-of-law state itself – 
was ever born out of a project or a vision but „in the midst of the storm” and „civil 
discord”, as Alexis de Tocqueville
2 put it. The struggle between the King and the 
Parliament  that unfolded with the death of Elisabeth I and the economic policies 
pursued  by  the  Stuarts  led  to  the  first  great  articulation  of the „freedom of the 
subjects” principle and of that of the equality of the citizens before the law. With 
the  abolition  of  the  hateful  Star  Chamber  in  1641,  it  was  the  first  attempt  to 
establish the independence of judges, whereas the need to restrain the arbitrary use 
of  power  by  the  Parliament  caused  the American colonists to draw up the first 
written Constitution. The great debates of the 17th and 18th Centuries on various 
notions such as freedom, the supremacy of the law, equality, the rule-of-law state, 
the  separation  of powers, the social contract  and so on were held within the 
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2 quoted by Friederich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, the European Institute, Iaşi, 1998, p. 77. 
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context of the Civil War, of the Glorious Revolution and of the French Revolution. 
And  on  those  occasions  however  when  there  was  an  attempt to put rationalist, 
plausible  and  seemingly  logical  theses  into  practice  –  and  we  refer  here to the 
French  and  the  Bolshevik Revolution – the failure was as spectacular as it was 
lamentable and at such a dear price
3.  
As we have mentioned before, what is remarkable about this encounter 
between dignity and law is therefore not the context in which it occurred but the 
lateness of its timing
4, considering that the historic „ferment” had been right there 
all  along,  as  had  been  the  opportunities.  Any  serious  analysis  should  take  into 
account  the  fact  that  human  dignity,  as  we  understand  it  today,  has  been 
systematically  violated  -  if not virtually trampled upon - in the course of history. 
Slavery,  serfage,  colonialism,  unimaginable  tortures,  homicidal  shows,  sacrifice 
ceremonies – the human history (sic!) abounds in such instances where the human 
being  was nothing more - for their own peers! - than just a work tool, a tool of 
mockery  or  a  device  used  to  test  the  sufference. And we do not refer here to 
obscure, occasional cases or situations that happened in a particular setting, but to 
institutionalized and collectively accepted structures!  
Only  one  instance  was  missing  from  this  gruesome  panoply:  that of the 
human being used as an experimental subject of scientific research. This is, frankly 
speaking, the episode newly opened by the Second World War (opened, but not yet 
closed – a caveat to those entertaining the illusion that such horrors are framed in 
the past tense!) But basically no one can say without blushing that until Hitler or 
Stalin came to power human dignity had been respected! What we may say is rather 
that the holocaust experience was „the last straw” or that it occurred at a time when 
humanity had just started to deny – at least officially – its bloody and oppressive 
past. 
As a matter of fact, the surprising thing is that dignity is not invoked in any 
of such regulatory acts - a sign that the past is „discarded”! Let us not forget that, at 
that  time,  the  Fundamental  Declaration  of  Human  Rights  in  France,  the  Bill  of 
Rights in the United States and the Slavery Abolition Act in the United Kingdom 
had been adopted for over a century! 
It  really  seems  strange  that  a  notion  with  a  philosophical backbone that 
goes  such  a  way  back  in  history  might be so utterly ignored both in the classic 
human  rights  declarations  -  of  the  18th  Century  -  and  in  the  19th  Century 
codifications.  No  terminological  association,  no  community  of meaning, not even 
the slightest connection was established by the lawmakers of the time between the 
two terms – human rights (young and freshly conceived at the time) and dignity. 
An association that today is almost "intuitively" imperative, beyond all evidence or 
„philosophy”, is just absent from the vision of our honorable ancestors. Freedom, 
equality before the law and the natural law are the conceptual grounds pur forth by 
the authors of the celebrated documents. No reference though to dignity. 
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The mystery behind this striking deficiency is revealed and the fact is fully 
explained once we cast a glance backwards and follow – generically and briefly, 
without  going  into  details that are outside the subject matter of our survey  - the 
genealogy and evolution of the notion of dignity within the historical realm of what 
we have commonly come to identify as the „Western civilization”.   
The  notion  of  dignity  essentially  entered  Western  tradition  through  the 
secular medium of the Latin authors, whose influence largely replaced that of the 
Greeks  during  the  17th  Century.  Indeed, ancient Greece doesn't even appear to 
have used a corresponding term for what we call dignity today. Virtue and value 
(arete), honor (time), reputation (doxa) and glory (kleos) were however important 
ethical  and  political  notions, based on a significance was much similar to that of 
the Latin notion of dignitas
5.  
The  Latin  notion  of  dignitas  basically  referred to value, as an attribute 
undoubtedly  attached  to  the  human  being.  And  not  just  any  value,  but  value 
associated to some form of public recognition – either as the dignity conferred by 
the  filling  in  of  a  public  office,  or  as  an aristocratic attribute of the  happy few 
(patricians  or  „optimates”),  or,  finally,  as  an  accomplishment,  the  attainment  of 
human  excellence  in  a  certain  field,  through  the  development  of  an  ability  or 
personal disposition
6.   
In other words,  dignitas, far from embodying the universalist ideal of the 
human  rights,  designated  –  on  the  contrary  –  a  highly  elitist  virtue,  specifically 
meant  to  distinguish  between the happy owner and the shapeless mass of „the 
many”. Therefore, this is why the illustrious lawmakers of the 18th Century did not 
understand to establish any correlation between the notion of „dignity” and that of 
„civil  rights”:  simply  because  at  that  time  it  did  not  call forth a universal value, 
intrinsic  to  the  human  being,  but  just  the  opposite,  namely  an  elitist  appanage 
whose only function was to bring to mind obsolete perquisites that the rights set 
out to abolish. 
The same reason – that would have been anyway sustained by the reserve 
typical to the „Age of Enlightenment” over the Christian heritage – also precluded 
such  heritage from being availed of. Although it comes up with one of the most 
complex  interpretations  of  dignity,  as  we  understand  it  today  (an  interpretation 
which  is  however  either  subject  to  mystification  by  an  excessively  politicized 
Church – in the Catholic realm – or kept aloof from the public debate space by the 
discreet  but  highly  tried  Orthodox  Church),  in the Middle Ages the Christianism 
itself did not make use of the proper notion, based on the same consideration of 
terminological  inaccuracy
7.  
In fact, the significance that we attach today to the term comes from Kant. 
He is the one who, in his „Metaphysics of morals”, is interpreting dignitas in a 
                                                                 
5 Jack Donelly – Human Dignity and Human Rights, University of Denver, 2009; the document is 
available on-line at: http://www.udhr60.ch/report/donnelly-HumanDignity_0609.pdf; last visit: 5 May 2012. 
6 Jack Donelly, op. cit. 
7 The new Catechism of the Catholic Church makes explicit reference to human dignity, built on the 
creation of man „in the image and likeness of God”. But such Catechism was drawn up in 1992 and 
published  for  the  first  time  in  1995,  therefore  long  after  dignity  had  been  incorporated in the 
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universalist  vein.  For  Kant,  dignity  is  the  absolute  value  inherent  to  the  human 
being, by virtue of which the human being is entitled to demand respect from the 
others  and  is  obligated,  in  turn,  to  give  it.  Therefore,  people  are  bound  to  one 
another by a bond of respect. „Act in such a way that you always treat humanity – 
whether in your own person or in the person of any other – as an end in itself and 
never simply as a means”, or „Be no man's lackey!” – are just some of the urgings 
by means of which the Konigsberg philosopher further attempted to illustrate and 
develop the notion of respect. And it is again Kant who places dignity, as a value 
that  is  intrinsic  to  the  human  being,  at  the  foundation  of  their  civil  and political 
rights
8. 
The reason why dignity in the acception of Kant was not assimilated by the 
lawmakers of the time is because the famous philosopher designed his theories of 
dignity  and  freedom  almost  concomitantly  with  the  period when the first human 
rights practices were being implemented by the American and French Revolutions
9. 
More than one century and two world conflagrations had to pass in order for the 
term with its new connotation to be assimilated by the social theories, to then 
penetrate  the  collective  mind  and  fi nally  to be incorporated into the body of 
national and international regulations. 
The logical question following from this brief historical excursus is: are we 
to understand that up until Kant there was no other term, no similar notion (other 
than dignitas)  to  designate the concept of the intrinsic value, unconditioned by 
merit  or  birth,  of  the  human  being?  It  is  a  question  that  only  a  linguistic  or 
philosophy  scientist  might  venture  to  answer  in  a  thorough  and  absolute  sense. 
Nevertheless, as regards the legal terminology employed by the authors of the first 
human rights declarations (or, to be more precise, the terminology used prior to the 
Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights  adopted  in  1948  –  the  legal  text  that 
references  for  the  first  time  „dignity”  among  the  fundamental  values  of  human 
rights), we are able to identify a matching term for dignity in what those texts refer 
to as natural rights.  
The scope and purpose of this work do not allow for an in-depth excursion 
into  the  evolution  of  the natural law doctrine, whose origins are buried deep in 
time. By opposing the natural rights to the divine right of kings, the Enlightenment 
thinkers  did  nothing  more  but  resurrect  the  tradition  generated  by  the  Roman 
Republic.  Tacitus  and,  first  of  all,  Cicero  are  the  authors who disseminated the 
tradition during the Latin Renaissance of the 17th Century, although the partenity 
of the idea of equality of the people and divine/natural justice is due to the Stoics, 
whereas some voices attribute it even to Aristotle
10. Still more interesting is the fact 
that, as the natural law theories came to be acutely (re)formulated, as we have said, 
within the effervescent context of the Enlightenment, the natural law concepts had 
already  been  "assimilated  with  tenacity  by  the  English common law through the 
entire  Catholic  Middle  Ages,  thanks  especially  to  the  influence  of  Henry  de 
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Bracton  (d.  1268  -  a/n) and Sir John Fortescue (d. cir. 1476 - a/n)"
11. And yet, 
among these concepts, as we shall see, is the equality before the law or the primacy 
of the law over the prince. In the midst of the Feudal Age, such ideas could easily 
be perceived as radical, if not outright... outrageous ! 
The natural rights that are referenced in most of the important regulatory 
texts on human rights of the 17th and 18th Centuries stem, in their turn, from the 
natural law doctrine. But what are, in essence, the postulates of such doctrine and 
how  do  they  differ  from the concept of dignity which, two centuries later, was 
going to replace that of natural rights in all of the international papers on human 
rights? 
The natural law affirms the existence of an order of human relations that is 
superior, fair and valid in absolute terms and that originates from the divine or the 
"natural" order. The natural law does not overlap with – on the contrary, it often 
opposes – the positive law seen as a human product, frequently meant to support 
party interests. The latter varies from one community to another, while the former 
remains immutable, the same in every place, since it is derived from divine justice, 
from  its  profound  rationality  and  naturalness.  The  positive  law  divides  and 
classifies  human  beings  and shows an irrepressible propensity for hierarchization 
and  asymmetry  in  the  relationships  among  them;  the  natural  law,  on the other 
hand, asserts that, in their essence, people are equal and independent and before 
God, both the slave and the prince are held to account according to the same rules. 
Finally,  natural  law  supports  natural  rights,  as  an inalienable heritage of each 
individual.  We  are  talking  about  the  right  to  „freedom,  ownership,  security  and 
defence  against  oppression”,  and  „the  right  to  life  and  the  right  to  pursue  and 
obtain happiness”.  
The reference to natural rights is absent from the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights adopted in 1948. It is replaced by the phrase fundamental rights and 
supplemented  by  the  notions  of  dignity  and value – as attributes of the human 
being.  
Ergo what is the difference? What new elements are brought by – or what 
elements are missing from – the notion of dignity? 
As we have seen, both dignity (in the Kantian conception), and natural law 
take their significance from the fact that they support an intrinsic, a-priori value of 
the human being. However, while in respect of natural law, such value is invoked 
as  a  mere  legitimation  of  the  social  order  it  asserts  (and,  therefore,  of  the 
fundamental rights as an integral part of such order), dignity, on the other hand, is 
not satisfied with only that: for it, the existential value of the human being is not 
just a justification of the fundamental rights but, moreover, it entitles the owner – 
meaning us all – to respect. And in point of fact, respect is not a mere argument, it 
is an obligation ! I am respectable, hence the others need to respect me. And in my 
turn, I respect them, because they too, as human beings, are respectable. How is 
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this binding mutual respect put into practice? Through the protection bestowed on 
me  by  the  fundamental  rights,  through  honoring  and  respecting  the fundamental 
rights of the other and, finally, though the way I exercise such rights. Respect is, 
therefore, at the core of the fundamental rights which are, in turn, the tool by means 
of which respect is put into practice and realized. In other words, dignity built on 
respect  is,  at  the  same  time  –  unlike natural law – both the grounds and the 
purpose of the fundamental rights. Thus dignity becomes, alongside freedom, the 
second target of the rights – since it is these two notions that eventually define the 
economic and social purpose for which the fundamental rights of every human 
being were established. 
To  the  mind  of  any  lawyer  familiar  with  the  principles that underlie the 
exercise  of  the  subjective  rights,  such  difference  of  status  entails  an  array  of 
tangible  consequences  -  hence,  of  overwhelming  importance.  And the reason is 
that, as any law graduate is aware, the economic and social purpose for which a 
right  is  established  is  not  a  mere  rhetoric  of  law  but  rather  one  of  the  main 
instruments to assess the lawful exercise of such right, since it demarcates, along 
with good-faith, the internal limits of the respective right. But it is precisely the 
exercise  of  any  subjective  right  within  the  boundaries  of  the  external  limits  but 
outside the boundaries of the internal limits that is construed as an abuse of right 
and is prohibited  and sanctioned by the law! 
Let us briefly resume the abuse of right theory: in order to be legitimate, 
the  exercise  of  a  right  has  to  cumulatively  meet  the  following  conditions:  
1) according to the content of the right, as established by the legal text regulating it 
(the external limit of the right); 2) to good-faith and, finally, 3) according to the 
economic and social purpose for which the respective right was established by the 
lawmaker (the last two conditions representing the internal limits of the right). The 
exercise  of  the  right  within  the  boundaries  set  out  by  the  legal  text (within the 
external  limits,  therefore),  but  outside  the  internal  boundaries  (that  is,  without 
good-faith or contrary to the economic and social purpose for which the right was 
established) is an abuse of right, and is prohibited
12. 
For  this  reason,  the  encounter  between  dignity  and  law  –  or,  more 
specifically,  the  reference  made  for  the  first  time  in  history,  in  the  Universal 
Declaration  of  Human  Rights  of  1948,  to  dignity  alongside  freedom,  as  a 
foundation-value  for such rights – generates by far more consequences than we 
would be inclined to believe! And this is because the supplementation of the list of 
defining  values  for  the  purpose  of  the  rights  means the interpretation of such 
purpose in a more restrictive vein and, therefore, the compression of the internal 
limits.  But  specifically  by  restraining  the  area  of  the  internal  limits,  the 
intermediary area – assigned to the abuse of right - is automatically extended. In 
other words, once dignity is incorporated into the law, the risk of committing an 
abuse  of  right  in  the  exercise  of the fundamental rights is increasing! And the 
reason is that, from now on, the exercise of the rights should also take into account 
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the respect we owe to one another, not only the need to act without restraints. It is 
very unlikely  that such change will be without effect on judicial  practice!
13 
We now need to quantify  the extent of such effect. The answer to that 
determination depends on the maner in which the notion of dignity is defined. And 
also on the manner of interpreting such definition! Because we have on our hands a 
term that is precise enough to lend itself to a definition with practical consequences 
but, at the same time, imprecise – or rather subjective – enough to be deprived of a 
univocal  definition  that  would  not  be  liable  to  intepretation.  And  because  there 
simply  is no legal definition. 
As regards the attempts of the legal doctrine to shape a definition and the 
difficulty  that  any  such  action  is  inevitably  faced  with  –  these  issues  will  be 
addressed in a future article... 
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